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Reflections from the 
International Criminal Court 
Prosecutor 
Fatou Bensouda* 
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to be with you 
today to give the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center Lecture 
on Global Justice. Allow me to thank the Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law for inviting me to speak to you. I look 
forward to our discussion.  
In June of this year, I took up the function of Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court, an international, independent, judicial 
institution that started its activities ten years ago.  
After ten years in operation, an overview and definition of the 
new perspectives related to international criminal justice is essential 
for reviewing and further improving the operations of the Court.  
Within the Office of the Prosecutor, this exercise has coincided 
with the transitional period, which started last December following 
my election by the Assembly of States Parties and completed on June 
15 when I officially took up my duties.1  
It is almost an understatement to say that the world today is very 
different than what it was ten years ago. In 2002, the aim was to 
establish an innovative and unprecedented institution created by the 
Rome Statute: the first independent, impartial, and permanent 
* Mrs. Bensouda is the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. 
She was elected to this position on December 12, 2011 and sworn in on 
June 15, 2012. Previously, she served as the Deputy Prosecutor. Prior to 
her work at the International Criminal Court, Mrs. Bensouda worked as 
Legal Adviser and Trial Attorney at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania, rising to the position 
of Senior Legal Advisor and Head of The Legal Advisory Unit. Before 
joining the ICTR, she was General Manager of a leading commercial 
bank in The Gambia. Between 1987 and 2000, she was successively 
Senior State Counsel, Principal State Counsel, Deputy Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Solicitor General and Legal Secretary of the 
Republic, and Attorney General and Minister of Justice, in which 
capacity she served as Chief Legal Advisor to the President and Cabinet 
of The Republic of The Gambia. Mrs. Bensouda holds a masters degree 
in International Maritime Law and Law of The Sea and as such is the 
first international maritime law expert of The Gambia. 
1. Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, ICC Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT., http: 
//www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+ 
the+Prosecutor/Biographies/TheProsecutor2012.htm (last visited Nov. 
13, 2012).   
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international criminal court.2 In 2002, the stakes were high: would 
this new judicial institution be able to assert itself in the 
international arena? Would it be able to open and successfully carry 
out a case? Could the Court be anything other than a paper tiger, an 
abortive project generating legal and academic debates but with no 
role to play in managing mass violence in real time, and with no hope 
of contributing effectively to the prevention of such violence?   
Ten years on, an objective observation would provide positive 
answers to all of these questions. The International Criminal Court, 
by virtue of its mandate and operations in the last ten years, has 
introduced a new paradigm in international relations: utilizing law as 
a global tool to promote peace and international security.  
To what does the Court today owe its status and legitimacy as a 
major actor on the international scene in relation to justice and 
conflict management? I would like to suggest two main causes. 
Firstly, its operational framework—its mandate—as defined by the 
Rome Statute; and secondly, the standardized, clear, transparent, and 
predictable working methods of the Office of the Prosecutor, 
providing it with the necessary legitimacy as a strictly judicial actor, 
in order to function effectively in a highly political international 
environment.  
Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me now to briefly present the four 
cardinal points, the four key elements of the model of international 
criminal justice established by the Rome Statute, which in my opinion 
explain why this model is both legitimate and sustainable. 
First, the International Criminal Court is permanent and could 
potentially have worldwide jurisdiction. Differing from other 
models—from the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals to the courts 
dealing with the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and 
Cambodia—the Court is a permanent actor with non-retroactive3 and 
potentially universal jurisdiction,4 which provides it with further 
legitimacy. These characteristics of the Court also encourage States as 
well as other international actors to realign their positions in 
accordance with the norms of the Court and to build a relationship 
and a model of cooperation over the long term.  
2. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 12, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 900, pmbl. [hereinafter Rome Statute] (“Determined . . . 
to establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court in 
relationship with the United Nations system, with jurisdiction over the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole . . . .”). 
3. Id. art 24. 
4. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 125(3) (“This Statute shall be open 
to accession by all States. Instruments of accession shall be deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.”). 
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Second, the Court is independent, as is its Prosecutor.5 So, it is 
the Prosecutor who, with complete independence and on the basis of 
the criteria laid down by the Rome Statute, initiates preliminary 
examinations, selects situations and cases, and decides whether or not 
to open an investigation into a situation referred by a State or the 
United Nations Security Council.6 The Prosecutor also has the 
capacity, of course, to open investigations proprio motu, with the 
authorization of the judges.7 Independence is the most fundamental 
component of the legitimacy of our mandate and work, and the main 
source of the impact of the Court on international relations, 
particularly its preventative impact. 
Complementarity is one of the founding principles of the Rome 
Statute model.8 States have primacy in terms of investigations and 
proceedings; the ICC was established as a court of last resort.9 It is 
within this context that the Office of the Prosecutor has developed its 
policy of positive complementarity, namely, a proactive policy of 
cooperation and consultation, aimed at promoting national 
proceedings and at positioning itself as a sword of Damocles, ready to 
intervene in the event of unwillingness or inability by national 
authorities.10 The Rome Statute did not just create a Court, but also 
5. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl. (“Determined to these 
ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an 
independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship 
with the United Nations system. . . .”); id. art. 42(1) (“The Office of the 
Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the Court.”). 
6. See id. art. 15 (describing the authority of the Prosecutor to initiate 
investigations).  
7. Id.  
8. See id. art. 1 (stating the Court “shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions”).  
9. See id. art. 17(1).  
10. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 2009-2012 ¶ 16 
(Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A 
8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStr 
ategy20092013.pdf.  
According to the Statute, States have the primary responsibility 
for preventing and punishing atrocities in their own territories. 
In this design, intervention by the Office is exceptional – it will 
only step in when States fail to conduct genuine investigations 
and prosecutions. This principle of complementarity has two 
dimensions: (i) the admissibility test, i.e. how to assess the 
existence of national proceedings and their genuineness, which is 
a judicial issue; and (ii) the positive complementarity concept, 
i.e. a proactive policy of cooperation aimed at promoting 
national proceedings. 
 Id.  
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a system of global criminal justice, within which national, regional, 
and international actors operate, in addition to other mechanisms of 
justice and reconciliation. Such interdependent and complementary 
action must guarantee that justice is rendered for all crimes 
committed in a given situation and ensure that impunity is 
eliminated. 
Finally, the fourth key element of the Rome system is the role of 
the Court in preventing and managing conflicts. The preamble to 
the Statute gives the Court the mandate to “contribute to the 
prevention of . . . crimes.”11 Recently, thanks in particular to the 
intervention by the Court and the Office of the Prosecutor, judicial 
issues have begun to form part of the considerations of the 
international community regarding international peace and security. 
An example of this is the unanimous referral of the situation in Libya 
by the United Nations Security Council.12 The importance of the 
preliminary examinations phase, which gives the States concerned 
the possibility of intervening to put an end to crimes before the Office 
of the Prosecutor initiates an investigation,13 should be highlighted 
here. This phase enables the Office of the Prosecutor to act as a 
catalyst for national proceedings.  
Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me now to say a few words about 
the working methods developed by the Office of the Prosecutor since 
the start of its operations which have enabled it to strengthen the 
legitimacy of its work and helped it to position the institution as a 
major actor in the conflict prevention and management. The 
publication of various documents on general policy and our 
prosecutorial strategy, the adoption of an operational manual, 
learning from previous experiences, and the transitional process 
between the first Prosecutor and myself, have helped my Office to 
fully standardize and enhance its operational process. This process is 
based on three fundamental phases. 
First, the preliminary examination phase: a policy document 
was prepared almost two years ago following a process of consultation 
with our partners—states, civil society, and international, and 
regional organizations.14 The preliminary examination phase allows 
11. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl. 
12. See S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26. 2011). 
13. See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, Int’l Crim. Ct. ¶ 13 
(Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/E278 
F5A2-A4F9-43D7-83D2-6A2C9CF5D7D7/282515/OTP_Draftpoli 
cypaperonpreliminaryexaminations04101.pdf (“Before making a 
determination on whether to initiate an investigation, the Office [of the 
Prosecutor] will also seek to ensure that the States and other parties 
concerned have had the opportunity to provide the information they 
consider appropriate.”). 
14. See generally id.  
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various actors to have the opportunity to take action.15 The objective 
is to ensure that the Office will contribute to the prevention or 
cessation of abuses by establishing transparent communication and 
ensuring predictability of its judicial activities.16 
The Office thus examines the extent to which its preliminary 
examination activities can serve to stimulate genuine national 
proceedings against those who appear to bear the greatest 
responsibility for the most serious crimes. This phase is one of the 
most remarkable efficiency tools we have at our disposal as it 
encourages national prosecutions and prevents or puts an end to 
abuses. Thus, this process allows the Court to avoid opening 
investigations and prosecutions when national mechanisms are 
functioning in accordance with our founding Statute. This is what we 
are doing in Colombia, Georgia, and Guinea.17  
Second, at the end of the preliminary examination process, on the 
basis of criteria set out in the Statute and on the basis of available 
evidence, we have to establish whether or not there are reasonable 
grounds to open an investigation into a given situation.18 Before 
opening an investigation or requesting authorization from the Pre-
Trial Chamber, our policy is to inform the relevant State officials and 
offer them the option to refer the situation to the Court with the aim 
of increasing the prospects of cooperation inter alia.19 This is what we 
have done with regards to the situations in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Uganda, for example.20  
If the relevant State chooses not to refer the situation, the Office 
remains prepared at all times to proceed proprio motu, as was done in 
the Kenya situation.21 In this case, after consultations with the 
national authorities over a possible referral, the Kenyan government 
decided to support proprio motu action by the ICC, stating that it 
remained fully committed to discharging its primary responsibility to 
establish a local judicial mechanism to deal with the perpetrators of 
the post-election violence and that it remained committed to 
cooperating with the ICC.22 Pursuant to the principle of 
independence, the policy of inviting referrals remains without 
prejudice to the case selection and prosecutorial strategy of the Office. 
15. Id. ¶ 94.  
16. Id. ¶ 20. 
17. Id. ¶ 31.  
18. Id. ¶¶ 27, 45.  
19. Id. ¶ 16.  
20. Id. ¶ 28.  
21. Id. ¶ 81.   
22. Id.  
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Finally, the Office of the Prosecutor is provided with the 
discretion to select cases.23 In its September 2003 policy document, 
the Office established that, on the basis of the Statute, and given the 
Court’s limited resources, the Office of the Prosecutor ought to focus 
the efforts and resources employed in investigation and prosecution on 
persons bearing the greatest responsibility, like heads of States or 
other organizations presumed to be responsible for these crimes.24 
This policy of focused prosecutions encourages marginalization of high 
level suspects which may lead to demobilization of armed groups. It 
also, through the principle of complementarity, encourages national 
authorities and other justice and reconciliation mechanisms to 
guarantee that the minor perpetrators of serious crimes are brought to 
justice as well. 
The Office is equally responsible for drawing particular attention 
to sexual and gender-based crimes, in addition to crimes against 
children. Since its inception, the Office has sought to file charges 
accordingly in the great majority of its cases. This will continue to be 
one of my priorities over the course of my mandate. 
One key point remains: in selecting its cases, the Office of the 
Prosecutor cannot yield to political considerations or adapt its work 
according to the peace negotiations timetable. It must always conduct 
its work on the basis of the law and of the evidence it has collected, 
and act accordingly, in an independent manner. However, the Office 
of the Prosecutor may, and has so far endeavoured to, announce the 
various phases of its work in advance, thereby permitting other 
actors, through its transparency and predictability, to adapt to the 
on-going judicial process. 
Thus, in December 2007, the Office of the Prosecutor announced 
to the Security Council that it would investigate those within the 
Sudanese government who were protecting and supporting Ahmad 
Harun.25 Six months later, in July 2008, the Office requested an arrest 
warrant for the Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir.26 In the course 
23. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15.  
24. Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office 
of the Prosecutor 3 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6 
/143594/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf. 
25. See generally Office of the Prosecutor, Sixth Report of the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant 
to UNSCR 1593 (2005) (Dec. 5, 2007); Press Release, Security Council, 
International Criminal Court Prosecutor Tells Security Council Sudan’s 
Government “Not Cooperating” in Darfur Investigation, Massive Crimes 
Continue, U.N. Press Release SC/9186 (Dec. 5, 2007). 
26. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation 
%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc02050109/icc02050109?lan=en-GB 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
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of these six months, the international community could have made 
preparations to support the action taken by the Office of the 
Prosecutor; but it did not and, therefore, an opportunity to put an 
end to the genocide in Darfur was missed. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, the issues faced by the Court today are no 
longer the same as in 2002. The Court no longer risks being an 
irrelevant entity: it has become a key actor on the international scene. 
Nevertheless, other challenges have presented themselves. 
First and foremost, the Court’s independence risks being 
attacked. Independence should not be taken for granted. National or 
community interests may provide incentives to control the Court 
through the undue strengthening of States’ oversight prerogatives. 
Even though these are accepted diplomatic practices in the 
international arena, they will harm the system established by the 
Rome Statute which is based on the concept of independent judicial 
activity. Without its independence, the Court is worthless. The 
second risk possible is the isolation of the Court. Reality has 
shown that some leaders sought by the Court have threatened to 
commit more crimes to retain power,27 thus blackmailing the 
international community by imposing on it an unbearable choice: 
peace or justice. The effectiveness of the Court will depend on how 
the political leaders and conflict managers respond to such blackmail. 
The third and final issue is cooperation. After ten years in 
operation, we have established a system that is operational. But in 
order to maximize our role and impact, as well as improving our 
effectiveness, we need the sustained cooperation of all the States 
Parties to the Statute.  
For the Court to be effective, it needs the strong and unwavering 
support of all the relevant actors, in keeping with its judicial mandate 
and its independence. It is with this support that the preventative 
potential of the Court and its impact on conflict management will be 
able to express itself. This is the objective we must achieve. I hope I 
can count on the support of those present here today to help us get 
there. 
27. See Xan Rice & Tania Branigan, Sudanese President Expels Aid 
Agencies, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2009/mar/05/sudan-aid-agencies-expelled (“The Sudanese presi-
dent, Omar al-Bashir, has reacted defiantly to his arrest warrant for war 
crimes in Darfur, vowing to act ‘decisively’ towards anyone threatening 
the country’s stability and announcing the expulsion of 10 international 
aid organisations today.”).  
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